
Update of the Cyber Threat Landscape and Its Relationship with Internet Hygiene

HACKADAY²

Securing identity

Kok Tin Gan

Partner, Cybersecurity and Privacy
Co-Founder of PwC Dark Lab









The ransomware landscape was disrupted in 2024, making them unpredictable following law enforcement disruptions and exit scams





Threat actors are rapidly adapting by diversifying their tactics and exploring alternative means to increase their chances of success



Skip the encryption; it's all about data theft

Single extortion returns with direct sale of victim's data on leak sites



Adoption of Generative Al in social engineering

Accelerate creation of highly convincing deepfake and phishing campaigns



Increased targeting of cloud and SaaS credentials

Targeting exposed configuration files with secrets and API keys



Significant increase in data sales

Specifically leaked credentials that extend beyond the victim to their third parties




Increase in fake SMS impersonation

Going beyond PII and credit data, and looking to steal valid credentials, sessions, and victim's metadata

Source: PwC Dark Lab, Threat Intelligence Monitoring Based on Proprietary Insights, Open Source Intelligence, and Dark Web Monitoring

whoami





This leads to today's million-dollar question\ How should we define and protect 'Identity'?

"Identity refers to an attribute or set of attributes that uniquely describes a user "



2024 Cyber Threats Overview with Identity as a twist



2023-27532) to

obtain stored credentials










































Unknown

Exploit Veeam Phishina Backup (CVE-

March 2024

cvbercriminal targets supply chain company

Root cause -

April 2024

Unknown cvbercriminal targets property developer

Root cause -**Exposed AWS** access key

April 2024

Unknown threat actor targets local utilities provider

Root cause -SQL injection

June 2024

Multiple aovernment bodies

impersonated to buy trust of consumers

to facilitate insurance policy renewal scam

Root cause -N/A

June 2024

Unknown threat actor targets tertiary education institution

Root cause -Valid credential from Initial Access Broker (IAB)

June 2024

Unknown threat actor targets local government corporation

Root cause -Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)

July 2024

LockBit ransomware targets shipping victim

Root cause -Valid SSLVPN credential

October 2024

Cyberespionage actor targets property developer

Root cause -**Malicious** resume upload to HR system (Phishing)

October 2024

Unknown opportunistic actor targets local airline

Root cause – Exploitation of Public-Facing Server

February 2024

RansomHouse a.k.a. Mario ransomware targets pharmaceutical company

Root cause -Poor cyber hygiene service exposure



April 2024

LockBit ransomware targets local hospital

Root cause -Valid SSLVPN credential from **Initial Access**

Broker (IAB)



June 2024

Personal data from public-facing systems of multiple organisations sold on dark web

Root cause -Leakage of valid credentials on dark web

May 2024

Unknown threat actor targets government department

Root cause -Exploit SQL injection vulnerability to

obtain MSSQL

June 2024

Unknown ransomware group targets healthcare victim

Root cause -**Exploit FortiOS** (CVE-2024-21762) to recover valid SSLVPN credentials

June 2024

Unknown threat actor targets local retail organization

Root cause -Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)

July 2024

Unknown threat actor targets local retail organization

Root cause -Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)

October 2024

Unknown threat actor targets research institute

Root cause -Valid M365 / SSL **VPN** credential

October 2024

Black Basta targets workplace technology provider

Root cause -Initial Access **Broker**









Data Exfiltration



⚠ Denial of Service



\$ Monetary Loss













February 2025

Summary of Lessons Learnt

Threat actors are more intentional and resourceful in their attacks, focusing on abusing valid identities to bypass defenses



Weaponisation of CVEs is increasingly targeted at compromising identity and/or bypassing controls safeguarding identity



Adaptation of leaked credentials
as an attack vector against a
broader attack surface such as
unintentionally exposed nonproduction or administrative
services





Evolution of phishing attacks
to capture valid sessions and
impersonate the victim's identity,
while others impersonate trusted
brands

Dark Lab

Exploitation of CVEs are increasingly focused on obtaining valid identities and bypassing identity security








Most targeted technologies:

- **SSLVPN**
- Firewall
- Mobile Device Management
- Unintentionally exposed public cloud assets/services
- Unhardened 3rd party hosting services

Dark Lab


The cybercriminal ecosystem is increasingly intentional in their weaponization of identities





The macro and micro shifts in the cyber threat landscape have significantly contributed to the increase in leaked credentials on the dark web








The use of infostealers has become more prevalent, with these tools specifically designed to harvest credentials from infected systems










COLLECTION






Source: PwC Dark Lab's Proprietary Insights

February 202

Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing campaigns persist, impersonating trusted brands





hishing Website Redirect

Victim visits phishing site and is redirected to the official M365 login page.

- Authentication
 Victim performs legitimate login with
 MFA on the M365 portal. Threat actor
 captures credentials and token.
- Persistence
 Threat actor requests Primary Refresh
 Token (PRT) to register own device
 for Single Sign-On (SSO) to M365.
 - Access and collect data from M365 services, and victim impersonation via internal spear phishing.

Dark Lab

How can we prevent and detect these attacks? We must focus on how to protect the identity!

PREVENTION



Employ a **conditional access policy** to restrict unauthorised access

- Restrict the use of tokens only from devices on which they were issued
- Enable token protection
- Allow sign-ins only from devices that hybridjoined to Entra ID or are managed by MDM or MAM solutions
- Require strong, multi-layered authentication methods
- Limit the session duration of Outlook on the Web (OWA) to 1 hour

DETECTION



Detect and monitor for anomalous activity


- Accesses from 2+ countries within short period in Entra ID
- Review the 'Risky' Sign-In on Entra ID
- Monitor for assignments of Temporary Access
 Passes on sensitive accounts
- Monitor for large numbers of users signing in "from" the same device
- Specific user events (e.g., user registered security information, started security info registration,...)




Send device registration notifications to users

Our approach to tracking domains – how do they begin?

Domains take an important role in infrastructure used by cybercriminals and the like. Dark Lab asks the question of: how do threat actors groom their domains?





Our approach to tracking domains – how do they begin?

We look historically at domains that are deemed suspicious or malicious.

Raw DNS Records

Data Feeds

Newly Registered Domains

WHOIS


Crowd-sourced Data
VirusTotal, URLScan, CriminalIP, Shodan

Data from Dark Lab's Cyber Threat Operations

Approach and outcome									
Domain Similarity	New domain name typo-squatting or resembling known companies with intent to impersonate or deceive through phishing								
DNS record	Identifying domains related to command-and-control infrastructure via known malicious IP addresses or ranges								
WHOIS	WHOIS record with questionable names, or email addresses from open-source intelligence								
Website Structure	Domain hosting a website that shows contents with clear impersonation intent of a known website								
Open-source Intelligence	Verdicts as submitted by the cyberseuciry community from crowd- sourced intelligence platform e.g. VirusTotal, Urlhaus								



What insights did we glean from our study into newly registered domains for 20 major gTLDs for a selected day in January 2025?



Source: PwC Dark Lab, January 2025 Threat Intelligence Analysis on 20 major gTLDs for one day, using Open Source Intelligence.


Remaining gTLDs include .online (87), .xin (60), .sbs (58), .click (42), .org (38), .net (38), .vip (29), .icu (24), .site (21), .cyou (18), .pro (11), .store (9), .biz (7), .club (2), and .asia (2)



Example of newly registered malicious domains



Newly registered domains are typically deployed in SMS to redirect and deceive victims into providing sensitive information (e.g., credentials, PII, etc.) by impersonating well-known organizations







- Impersonate BOC rewards portal to target Macau and HK
- Trick victims to provide credit card info, OTP from credit card and PII, e.g., name, address email, phone number...

SMS aside, newly registered domains are also used widely in emails to redirect and deceive victims into providing sensitive information (e.g., credentials, PII, etc.) by impersonating well-known organizations



「易通行」 閣下未能成功完成自動繳費,請盡快補交,逾期面臨最高5000元罰款及不獲續牌! https://





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February 2025

Example of newly registered malicious domains (cont'd.)


Spam

Malware

C2

Social media and instant messaging platforms have become a popular target for financial gain in recent years, facilitated by low cost to register look-alike domains







Example of newly registered malicious domains (cont'd.)

Phishing Spam Malware C2

Threat actors leveraging infostealers (e.g., Lumma) or hosting C2 often register new domains to either distribute the malware to unsuspecting users or to maintain persistence and communicate with their victim.







Why might this be happening?

Lack of Proactive Governance of gTLD




Per ICANN, registrars rely on the community's abuse report to identify and takedown malicious domains



There is a lack of a proactive, regular and measurable monitoring mechanism to flag suspicious domains in a timely manner

This similar pain point extends to ccTLDs (!)

Too Simple Registration Process, Compounded by Low Cost



We devised a proactive mechanism and are working with .top to proof of concept it, before looking to scale out

Receive zone file from gTLD on regular basis

Conduct technical analysis focusing on objective, observable metrics

DNS metrics, appearance look-alike, WHOIS, ...

Supplement with crowdsourced intelligence on known-bads

Reports of malicious activities, crawling for questionable keywords, reviewing submissions on well-known TI platforms...

Reporting to gTLDs/

Operationalize through secure channel such as Jira ITSM

Takedown by gTLD or share with law enforcement and potential victims



Official collaboration since 2024 Hack A Day to strengthen Hong Kong's cyberspace resilience

Source: https://www.pwchk.com/en/press-room/press-releases/pr-111124.html

Dark Lab

ebruary 2025

.my and .pw domain related to Lumma stealer

□ Domain list - 8 Domains			Associations ①	Detections ①	Registrar	Created	Last updated	
cooingshutwz.my 104.21.68.48 172.67.186.169	હ	©	∰ lummac +1	2/94		2024-12-01 00:00:00	2024-12-01 00:00:00	©
youngsweays.my 104.21.96.1 104.21.16.1 104.21.80.1 dga	હ	©	₿ lummac +2	18/94		2024-12-02 00:00:00	2024-12-02 00:00:00	©
exchanwrysu.my 104.21.80.1 104.21.32.1 104.21.48.1 dga	હ	©	∯ lummac +1	14/94		2024-12-02 00:00:00	2024-12-02 00:00:00	%
lonylexpedn.my 188.114.97.0 188.114.96.0 188.114.97.7	હ	©	įį̃ lummac +2	13/94		2024-12-02 00:00:00	2024-12-02 00:00:00	©
lettuchsy.my 172.67.188.28 104.21.7.245	હ	©	ð lummac +1	8/94		2024-12-01 00:00:00	2024-12-01 00:00:00	(%)
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abrasigehs.my 104.21.32.1 104.21.16.1 104.21.48.1	Ç.	©	∰ lummac +2	13/94		2024-12-01 00:00:00	2024-12-01 00:00:00	(%)

□ Domain list - 10 Domains				Associations (i)	Detections (i)	Registrar	Created	Last updated	
pooreveningfuseor.pw 104.21.47.153 172.67.148.219 nxdomain potential-c2	,	હ	િ	∰ lummac +3	14/94	NICENI	2024-02-14 12:01:07	2024-02-22 11:06:24	(%)
politefrightenpowoa.pw 188.114.96.0 188.114.97.0 172.67.140.1	,	હ્યુ	<u>©</u>	∰ lummac +2	17/94	PDR Lt	2023-12-04 20:16:21	2024-12-05 00:32:28	&
chincenterblandwka.pw 188.114.96.3 188.114.97.3 188.114.97.0	હ [D	િ	∰ lummac +2	16/94	PDR Lt	2023-12-21 14:02:06	2024-12-22 00:09:46	%
sideindexfollowragelrew.pw 172.64.80.1 188.114.97.3 188.114.96.3	,	٧.	©	∰ lummac +3	16/94	PDR Lt	2023-12-30 18:08:42	2024-12-31 00:10:33	(%)
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recessionconceptjetwe.pw 172.67.187.94 104.21.64.188	,	હ	©	∯ lummac +2	17/94	PDR Lt	2023-12-26 17:45:22	2024-12-27 00:09:43	%
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Lumma gTLD

☐ Domain list - 10 Domains			Associations ①	Detections ①	Registrar	Created	Last updated	
babberstalek.org 172.67.194.49 104.21.76.119	Ç.	©	∰ lummac +2	20/94		2025-01-24 00:00:00	2025-01-24 00:00:00	(%)
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classyhelped.net 104.21.112.1 104.21.80.1 104.21.64.1	હ	િ	∰ lummac +2	21/94		2025-01-24 00:00:00	2025-01-25 00:00:00	(%)
climepunneddus.com 172.67.185.92 104.21.88.148	Ç	િ	∰ lummac +2	20/94		2025-01-24 00:00:00	2025-01-24 00:00:00	(%)
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beevasyeip.bond 172.67.205.24 104.21.15.29	Ç	િ	∰ lummac +1	13/94		2025-01-19 00:00:00	2025-01-19 00:00:00	(%)
broadecatez.bond 104.21.77.186 172.67.210.243 91.195.240.123	Ç	િ	∰ lummac +1	14/94		2025-01-19 00:00:00	2025-01-19 00:00:00	©
carfeuspitt.bond 104.21.65.106 172.67.145.35 91.195.240.123	Ç	િ	∰ lummac +3	17/94		2025-01-19 00:00:00	2025-01-19 00:00:00	©
ecofriendlyhometop.top 104.21.50.213 172.67.167.116 91.195.240.123	હ	6	∰ lummac +1	16/94		2025-01-19 00:00:00	2025-01-19 00:00:00	(%)



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